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Abstract. We show a practical preimage attack on the cryptographic
hash function Maraca, which was submitted as a candidate to the NIST
SHA-3 competition. Our attack has been verified experimentially.
1 Introduction
Cryptographic hash functions are easy to compute, deterministic functions that
map an input message of arbitrary length to a short, fixed-length digest. They
are important building blocks in many cryptographic applications. Secure cryp-
tographic hash functions are required to have several security properties, such
as collision resistance and preimage resistance. Informally, preimage resistance
means that, given a hash function output, it should be hard to find an input
message hashing to this output.
Maraca [1] is a hash function proposal that was recently submitted as a candi-
date to the NIST SHA-3 competition, which aims to select a new cryptographic
hash function standard. Canteaut and Naya-Plasencia [2] found a theoretical
collision attack on Maraca, requiring 2237 calls to the compression function and
a memory of 2230.5 bits. We propose a practical preimage attack on Maraca.
After a one-time precomputation, our attack can find many preimages for any
hash output in just a few seconds on an average PC.
2 Analysis of the Maraca S-box
The main weakness we exploit lies within the 8 × 8 bit bijective S-box used in
Maraca. As was already noted in [2], three of the output bits are linear functions
of the inputs. A more careful analysis of the properties of the Maraca S-box
led to the following observation. The Maraca S-box can be made into an affine
function by restricting the input to one of several affine spaces of dimension up
to five. Thus, one needs to impose just three affine conditions on the input bits
of the S-box to turn it into an affine function.
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3 Attack Principle
Each round of Maraca processes a new 1024-bit message block and reuses three
previous message blocks from a window of 47. A round consists of three identical
1024-bit permutations, each containing 128 copies of the Maraca S-box. Thus,
we have 1024 degrees of freedom at our disposal for 384 S-boxes. This is clearly
insufficient to be able to impose three independent affine conditions on the inputs
of each S-box. But it is possible to carefully choose which conditions to impose on
which S-boxes, such that many of these conditions depend on earlier conditions,
and will thus be satisfied automatically. Then, on average, only 960 conditions
are required per round of Maraca, leaving 64 degrees of freedom unused per
message block.
After the entire message has been processed, Maraca performs 47 blank
rounds in which previous message blocks are reused, and a number of final calls
to the 1024-bit permutation. The latter can be inverted trivially, but the for-
mer can not, as they depend on the input message. No new degrees of freedom
are available in these 47 blank rounds, but we can use the yet unused degrees
of freedom available from the earlier rounds. After 750 message blocks, enough
degrees of freedom can be accumulated to also overcome the 47 blank rounds.
4 Practical Results
The attack consists of two phases: a one-time precomputation phase and an on-
line phase. The precomputation phase determines how to linearise each S-box,
and constructs a 1024-dimensional affine space of input messages for which the
entire Maraca hash function becomes an affine function, except for the final per-
mutations which we can simply invert, This phase took about 10.7CPU-days
and 20GB of distributed memory on a cluster of 32 AMD Opteron nodes. The
online phase consists of inverting the final permutations, and then combining
the appropriate basis messages from the 94MB data file generated by the pre-
computation. This takes just a few seconds on an average PC and is guaranteed
to succeed for any given digest value.
5 Conclusion
We have shown a practical preimage attack on the hash function proposal
Maraca. This clearly shows that Maraca is not preimage resistant, and hence
not a secure cryptographic hash function.
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